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Abstract
Growing awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience in the early years of the 21st century led to the emergence of
the new academic field of “neuroethics,” which studies the ethical implications of developments in the neurosciences.
However, despite the acceleration and evolution of neuroscience research on nonhuman animals, the unique ethical issues
connected with neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals remain underdiscussed. This is a significant oversight
given the central place of animal models in neuroscience. To respond to these concerns, the Center for Neuroscience and
Society and the Center for the Interaction of Animals and Society at the University of Pennsylvania hosted a workshop on
the “Neuroethics of Animal Research” in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. At the workshop, expert speakers and attendees
discussed ethical issues arising from neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals, including the use of animal
models in the study of pain and psychiatric conditions, animal brain-machine interfaces, animal–animal chimeras, cerebral
organoids, and the relevance of neuroscience to debates about personhood. This paper highlights important emerging
ethical issues based on the discussions at the workshop. This paper includes recommendations for research in the United
States from the authors based on the discussions at the workshop, loosely following the format of the 2 Gray Matters reports
on neuroethics published by the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues.
Key words: animal research ethics; animal welfare; bioethics; cerebral organoids; chimeras; machine-brain interface;
neuroethics; personhood
INTRODUCTION
Growing awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience
in the early years of the 21st century led to the emergence of
the new academic field of “neuroethics.”Academic meetings and
symposia, new journals, emerging university centers and pro-
grams, and an official society have provided venues for discus-
sion of neuroethical issues. The importance of this new field was
demonstrated in 2013, when President Obama announced the
launch of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) BRAIN Initiative
created with a mission of revolutionizing our understanding of
the brain and simultaneously called on the Presidential Commis-
sion for the Study of Bioethical Issues to create a working group
to specifically address the complicated ethical issues that arise
from our rapidly increasing neuroscientific knowledge.
Two volumes entitled Gray Matters resulted from this exam-
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volume, released in May of 2014, examined “the integration of
ethics into neuroscience research across the life of a research
endeavour.”1 The second volume, released in March of 2015,
focused on “a set of controversial topics that illustrate the ethical
tensions and societal implications of advancing neuroscience
and technology: cognitive enhancement, consent capacity, and
neuroscience and the legal system.”2 The 2 volumes of the
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues report
surveyed a broad and complex landscape of ethical issues, pre-
sented a concise set of illustrative examples, provided insight-
ful analysis, and included concrete, practical recommendations
throughout. The reports have provided and will continue to
provide valuable guidance for neuroscience researchers and pol-
icymakers for years to come. As an example, the Journal of Neu-
roscience recently published a set of 8 guiding principles for the
BRAIN Initiative from the NIH Neuroethics Working Group along
with an accompanying commentary.3,4
The vast majority of initial BRAIN Initiative funding was
targeted at developing animal models of brain function, and
the NIH recently announced a call for applications for creat-
ing new colonies of marmosets for “transgenic and chimeric
neuroscience research.”5 But despite the rapid acceleration and
evolution of neuroscience research on nonhuman animals, nei-
ther the 2 Gray Matters volumes nor the recent 8 guiding prin-
ciples make any reference to ethical issues connected with
neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals. This is a
significant oversight given the central place of animal models in
neuroscience. As such, there is a strong need for exploration of
neuroethical issues involving animals.
Though several reports and guidance documents exist that
are focused on the use of animals in neuroscience research,
these documents have primarily focused on applying familiar
ethical frameworks (such as the “3Rs” of reduction, replace-
ment, and refinement) to neuroscience research rather than
emphasizing new ethical challenges unique to neuroscience. But
just as it has been a central theme from neuroethics that our
increased abilities to interpret and influence human brains have
given rise to unique ethical questions that differ from traditional
questions in bioethics,6 our increased ability to study and manip-
ulate animal brains also raises new questions and concerns
that go beyond previous discussions of animal ethics. These
new questions have not yet been addressed in a systematic
and comprehensive manner, though the need for neuroethics to
include explicit discussion of issues involving nonhuman ani-
mals is increasingly being recognized in special journal issues,7
statements from journal editors,8 and edited volumes.9
To respond to these concerns, the Center for Neuroscience
and Society (CNS) and the Center for the Interaction of Animals
and Society at the University of Pennsylvania hosted a workshop
on the “Neuroethics of Animal Research” in Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, in June 2016. This workshop featured expert speakers
and participants in neuroscience, ethics, psychology, veterinary
medicine, and epidemiology as well as representatives from
the NIH BRAIN Workgroup, the Committee on Guidelines for
the Care and Use of Mammals in Neuroscience and Behavioral
Research, the pharmaceutical industry, and an animal protec-
tion organization. The workshop was focused on identifying
emerging and under-discussed ethical questions arising from
neuroscience research involving nonhuman animals and was
organized by Martha Farah, Director of the CNS, Adam Shriver,
Visiting Research Fellow at the CNS, and James Serpell, Director
of the Center for the Interaction of Animals and Society.
After brief introductory and stage-setting remarks from
Martha Farah and Adam Shriver, the 1-day workshop focused on
5 topics presenting new ethical questions. The morning session
was focused on the use of animal models in neuroscience
research on pain and psychiatric conditions and featured
presentations from Kenneth Sufka, Professor of Psychiatry at the
University of Mississippi, Joseph Garner, Associate Professor of
Comparative Medicine at Stanford, and Larry Carbone, Director
of the Animal Care and Use Committee at UCSF. The afternoon
was focused on “ontology-bending” new technologies that
challenged our previous conceptions of “human,” “animal,”
“person,” and “machine.” This session featured presentations
from Andy Schwartz, Professor of Neurobiology at Pittsburgh,
Evan Ballaban, Professor of Psychology at McGill University,
Helena Hogberg, Research Associate at Johns Hopkins University,
Robert Streiffer, Professor of Bioethics and Ethical Theory at
Wisconsin, and Kristin Andrews, the York University Research
Chair in Animal Minds. General discussion was included
throughout the day’s presentations.
This report provides an overview of the ethical issues that
arise in neuroscience research on nonhuman animals based
on the workshop presentations and discussion. This includes
a discussion of the use of animal models of pain and human
psychiatric disorders, an analysis of recent technological break-
throughs relating to neuroscience research on nonhuman ani-
mals, and an overview of the ways that neuroscience interven-
tions can challenge traditional categories of moral patienthood.
Based on these discussions, we include analysis here of key eth-
ical questions related to neuroscience research on nonhuman
animals. From these discussions, we (the authors of this paper)
propose recommendations for ethical conduct of neuroscience
research on nonhuman animals moving forward. These recom-
mendations should be considered the authors’ own and may not
represent the views of other workshop participants or that of
the funding or hosting institutions. Though the workshop was
several years ago, the topics covered continue to be important
ethical issues.
ANIMAL MODELS OF PAIN
AND PSYCHIATRIC CONDITIONS
Neuroscience research has progressed tremendously over the
past half century, but has also seen serious and expensive fail-
ings in attempts to use animal models of human mental states
such as pain10 as well as animal models of treatments for psychi-
atric conditions.11 These topics were discussed at the workshop
by Drs Kenneth Sufka, Joseph Garner, and Larry Carbone.
Regarding pain, many of the most common assays used in
pain research on nonhuman animals (such as hot plate, Von Frey
fibers, and tail flick tests) produce observable reactions that are
spinally mediated and thus do not depend on brain activation.
Pain is defined as having sensory and affective components,12
and the affective component of pain is arguably the most clin-
ically significant,13 yet the most common tests in animals do
not capture affect. Moreover, most assays are testing acute pain,
but in humans the most serious clinical challenges involve
chronic pain.14 As Kenneth Sufka stated succinctly during his
presentation, “I have yet to figure out why we need to develop
an analgesic for humans who leave their hands on a hot stove
for too long.” Moreover, even when innovative new models of
chronic pain are developed, they are often “validated” using the
same measures of pain that are spinally mediated rather than
brain dependent. A recent review explains that “[f]rustration is
mounting over the limited success of the field in translating the
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few decades using animal models into truly new, effective and
safe clinical analgesics.”10
For this reason, Sufka15,16 and others17–19 have developed
conditioned place preference measures of pain. In these tests,
animals are exposed to different stimuli in specific locations,
and their willingness to approach or avoid those locations in the
future is measured. Conditioned place aversion appears to rely
on activity in the brain regions that are crucial for pain affect
and chronic pain symptoms in humans. Moreover, the animals
choosing to avoid areas they associate with negative events
intuitively seems to better capture the negative valence of pain
that makes pain undesirable for humans. The facial grimace
scale20 also appears to be a promising method for evaluating
pain affect in mice. Nevertheless, much pain research still uses
older models that do not appear to capture the most clinically
significant aspects of pain, rendering them poor predictors of
analgesic efficacy. The primary purpose of pain research on
animals is to find effective treatments of pain in humans, but
most effective analgesics are still “based on mechanisms of
action that have been recognized for some time,” and many new
compounds designed as painkillers are failing clinical trials.21
As stated in a recent review, “Many are frustrated with the lack
of translational progress in the pain field, in which huge gains
in basic science knowledge obtained using animal models have
not led to the development of many new clinically effective
compounds.”10 This failure has only become more significant as
the opioid crisis continues to cause massive harms due, in part,
to the inability to find effective analgesics with less addictive
properties than opioids.
As explained by Joseph Garner at the workshop, there are
arguably even more severe translation problems when it comes
to the modeling of human psychiatric conditions and brain-
based diseases, and particularly with preclinical trials of drugs
intended to treat those conditions. The success rate of drugs in
clinical trials that made it through preclinical testing on animals
is only 1 in 10 in humans.22 Because the primary justification
given for invasive, non-therapeutic animal research is that the
potential benefits outweigh the potential harms, this “90% deval-
uation” of the animal tests places serious pressure on the ethical
justification for such research. Though the failure of human
trials is not entirely a result of a failure to translate, the trans-
lation failure is nevertheless a major part of the explanation.
These high failure rates not only mean that many animals are
needlessly suffering but also that limited financial resources
are lost.
In 2010, a major shift occurred when researchers began to
question the validity of the animal models being used. One
review found that of approximately 200 genetically modified
mouse models of Alzheimer’s disease, none of them had been
replicated in human studies.23 Another review published the
same year found that of 500 studies reporting effective treat-
ments for ischemic strokes, only 2 successfully translated to
humans.24 Specifically in regard to animal models of human
psychiatric disorders, Nestler and Hyman wrote: “Many of the
symptoms used to establish psychiatric diagnoses in humans
(for example, hallucinations, delusions, sadness and guilt) can-
not be convincingly ascertained in animals.”11 Researchers, and
particularly the pharmaceutical industry, have started seriously
considering the possibility that the animal models being used
might be unreliable.
The discussion of concerns about translation models contin-
ues today. A recent proposed roadmap for Parkinson’s research
stated, “Currently, no animal model faithfully reproduces all the
key clinical features of PD.”25 A valuable overview of some of
the issues with the validity and reproducibility of animal models
used in neuroscientific research can be found in Johnson,26 and a
more general overview of recent evidence relating to the quality,
validity, and value of pre-clinical animal research regardless of
scientific discipline can be found in Pound.27
Garner has developed an extensive critique of current mod-
els. At the workshop, he argued that treatments that appear
to work in animal models have a poor track record in humans
in part because too many research protocols are “modeling the
model” rather than “modeling the disease.” That is, they are con-
tinuing with a “model”of a disorder that is known to inaccurately
capture a similar disorder in humans. Many behaviors or assays
in animals taken to be models of particular disorders of humans
are inadequate. For example, all of the models of Parkinson’s
in animals involve dopaminergic cell loss. However, in humans,
there are symptoms predictive of Parkinson’s that occur well
before any dopaminergic cell loss. Thus, Garner argues, the
model is only capturing a symptom, rather than an underlying
cause, of the disorder. The forced-swim test is another well-
known model with clear welfare issues that is a questionable
“model” of multiple human psychiatric conditions28,29 but is
nonetheless widely used, though this may finally be starting to
change.30
Why do so many inadequate models persist in the search
for human treatments? Garner offered several explanations, as
follows.
The Incentive Structure of Academic Publishing.
Pharmaceutical companies have started to move away
from some of the least translatable animal models
more quickly than academic researchers. These
companies lose money from poor choices and thus
are incentivized to stop using non-predictive models.
However, NIH R01 grants are a central feature of the
research funding structures for universities. R01 grants
are renewable, and there is a 5 to 10 times greater
chance of having an R01 grant renewed than getting
a new R01 grant funded. Because grants are often tied
to models, researchers are incentivized to continue
using the same models, as they are much more likely
to have grants using the same model renewed than
to have new grants using different models approved.
Moreover, if many of the reviewers for journals are
invested in an old model for a disorder because of
their own background, this can lead to problems with
new models being adopted.
A Lack of Clinical Knowledge. Researchers who study
models of disorders in animals do not necessarily see
humans in a clinical context with that disorder. Many
models are based on descriptions from the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but
these criteria only partially and imperfectly capture
the expression of disorders. Thus, a lack of experi-
ence with humans with a particular condition can
lead researchers to miss cues that the model is not
truly getting at the same disorder, cues that would be
apparent from a more holistic understanding of the
disorder in humans.
A Lack of Comparative Knowledge. Many researchers
are not experts in the biology and behavior of the
animals they are working with. This can lead to
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Excessive Homogeneity Among Research Subjects.
The goal of human clinical research is to test
treatments on a diverse and heterogeneous portion of
the population to ensure it is an effective treatment for
humans generally. However, in much animal research,
the approach is dramatically different: genetically
similar animals kept in identical housing with
identical temperatures on identical feeding schedules
are used, and this may lead to false indications that a
particular treatment is effective (or ineffective) due to
the focus on a narrow range of animals considered.
Ethical Issues With Animal Models
One problem raised repeatedly throughout the workshop was
that the putative ethical justification for animal research is
based on an assumed harm-benefit analysis where harms to
nonhuman animals are outweighed by the potential benefits
that would accrue to humans (or, in some cases, to other ani-
mals). Though important steps have been taken with the cre-
ation of the ARRIVE Guidelines31 and the AALAS–FELASA Work-
ing Group reports on harm-benefit analysis,32 at present there
is no governmental requirement for performing genuine harm-
benefit analysis in particular research programs in the United
States. Funding agencies determine whether research is worth
funding, and IACUCs are tasked with minimizing harms, but
there is no requirement for directly weighing harms against
expected benefits, so in fact a harm-benefit analysis is never
strictly speaking required at any point in the research planning
process.
Some have attempted to argue that the fact that funding
agencies evaluate potential benefits and IACUCs are asked to
minimize harms indicates that a reliable harm-benefit analysis
does exist in the US system, but this is based on a misun-
derstanding of harm-benefit analysis. If the expected harms
and benefits of research are never directly evaluated against
one another, then there can be no basis for thinking that the
benefits of research are comparatively more significant than
the harms, no matter how selective funding agencies are and
no matter how judicious IACUCs are. This fact is codified in
the requirements of institutional research boards that oversee
research on humans who are asked to both minimize risk and
to ensure a favorable risk–benefit analysis. Merely minimizing
risk, even where research has clear benefits, is not sufficient for
ensuring a favorable ratio of benefits to risks.
Moreover, the 2015 NIH decision to eliminate most chim-
panzee research on the grounds that such research was
unnecessary is evidence that the current process for approving
research is not robust enough to rule out animal models that
are not justified by a true harm-benefit analysis. Both funding
agencies and IACUCs arguably performed their roles correctly
in evaluating previous chimpanzee research; nevertheless,
when an independent commission looked at the research, it
concluded that most of the research on chimpanzees was not
necessary. Thus, despite the challenges of assessing harms and
potential benefits from research, it nevertheless should be the
case that there is a point in the process where the harms and
expected benefits of the research are directly weighed against
one another, and this analysis should be presented in a clear
and transparent manner.
Nevertheless, a favorable harm-benefit analysis by no means
guarantees ethical research standards. Workshop participants,
bioethicists, and researchers generally were divided over what
additional ethical restrictions exist on experimentation on
nonhuman animals. Larry Carbone noted that many bioethicists
believe that harming others without their consent is virtually
always wrong and that this constraint may extend to nonhuman
animals.33,34 Workshop participant David DeGrazia, along with
Jeff Sebo, has argued that morally responsible animal research
must give each animal a worthwhile life, cause no unnecessary
harms, and meet the basic needs of each animal in addition to
having a favorable harm-benefit ratio, and that even satisfying
these constraints may not be a guarantee of ethical research.35
It is widely recognized that keeping animals in restrictive
conditions, performing invasive procedures on them against
their will, and ultimately ending their lives causes harms to
those animals. Even the strongest proponents of animal research
recognize these as harms but claim that those harms are jus-
tified by the potential benefits of animal research for humans.
However, if thousands of animals are used in failed models
lacking predictive validity, this research causes harm to animals
without producing any benefits. Harming nonhuman animals
without producing any benefits is not justifiable. Moreover, there
are direct costs to human interests from relying on inefficient
models. This money could be redirected to productive ends,
whether in the pursuit of scientific advancement or on other
societal priorities.
IN VITRO BRAINS (OR BRAINS-ON-A-CHIP)
Current models in toxicology testing rely on testing toxins on
large numbers of animals, usually mice. These are referred to
as in vivo testing and are currently considered the “gold stan-
dard” of toxicology testing by the FDA. Such research requires
thousands of animals to be exposed to aversive experiences
and killed. Alternative “in vitro” tests have been developed that
examine the effects of toxins on cells that are not in living organ-
isms but rather in artificial environments.36 In an optimistic
assessment at a 2017 Senate Appropriations Committee, NIH
Director Francis Collins suggested that in 10 years, no animals
would be used in toxicity testing and the field would move
entirely to in vitro models.37
Unfortunately, as explained by workshop participant Helena
Hogberg, because the FDA treats in vivo models as their gold
standard for translational research, alternative, non-animal
models must typically be validated against animal models to
gain federal approval. Because mouse models are imperfect
models of human disease, this means that new alternatives
must mirror an imperfect model to be implemented in toxicity
research. On the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s
current regulatory standards, alternative models could in
principle model human disease better than mouse models and
fail to gain approval, and no model could in principle receive
a stronger evaluation than a mouse model. FDA standards
therefore make it politically impossible to develop models of
human disease that are more accurate than mouse models.
Researchers at the Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing
at Johns Hopkins hope to identify toxicity pathways and
mechanisms that will allow in vitro models to become the
new standards for testing—thus greatly reducing the number
of animals harmed—but this will require FDA endorsement and
acceptance.
As part of this search for alternative and better methods of
toxicology testing, researchers have been developing “organ-on-
a-chip” models that can be used to assess toxicity at the molec-
ular, cellular, and organ levels. Models have been developed for
livers, eyes, and other organs. Efforts are also underway to create
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a more holistic representation of the interaction of different
systems within humans. At Johns Hopkins University’s Center
for Alternatives to Animal Testing, researchers are designing
models to assess neurodevelopmental toxicology by using brain-
on-a-chip models. The motivation for this work is that 1 in 6
children in the United States have 1 or more developmental dis-
orders, many of which are neurodevelopmental disorders. The
National Research Council estimated that 3% of developmental
disorders are due exclusively to chemical exposure and 28% are
due at least partly to chemical exposure.38
Researchers have developed a 3-dimensional partial model
of rat brains that contains neurons, astrocytes, and microglia.
These neurons exhibit spontaneous electrical activity, although
they receive no sensory stimuli. The models trace the devel-
opment of cells from induced pluripotent stem cells to neural
precursor cells and finally into neurons, thus demonstrating the
influence of various chemicals in the cells’ environment. The
phenotypes of these cells have been shown to mimic the behav-
ior of neurons in humans with various neurodevelopmental
disorders such as Parkinson’s.
Ethical Issues With In Vitro Brains
If these models are successful, they could replace the thousands
of nonhuman animals who are harmed and killed in toxicity
testing each year. Animals in toxicity tests can live extremely
compromised lives, experiencing acute and chronic pain due to
experimentation. The benefits of this change would therefore be
quantitatively and qualitatively immense and has the potential
to save thousands of animals from pain, distress, and death in
toxicity tests. The EPA recently decided to allocate $4.25 million
to funding the research of alternatives, including $849,000 to
alternative models of neurotoxicity.39 Additional funding could
accelerate this research and spare many animals from needless
harm, and could help lead to the replacement of animal models
as the gold standard of neurotoxicology testing.
However, one possible concern with neural arrays is whether
groups of neurons, when they reach a certain level of complexity
and organization, could produce sentience and therefore attain
some moral status. This might initially sound implausible, but
most neuroscience researchers agree that our minds and other
animals’ minds ultimately consist of nothing more than coordi-
nated neural activity, so at some point arrays of neurons orga-
nized in particular ways do attain moral status. Given the small
number and limited functional connections of neurons involved
in current 3D models, it seems unlikely that they presently
exhibit any morally significant sentience. We should neverthe-
less ask if, as the models become more complex, they will
eventually reach a point at which sentience is a genuine concern.
Many researchers have expressed the idea that neural models
raise no ethical concerns because they are not “connected to the
outside world.” This can be read in 2 ways: (1) researchers might
believe that, as a matter of empirical fact, when neurons are not
connected to sensory inputs they fail to develop patterns of firing
that are constitutive of thought or feelings; or (2) researchers
might believe that a connection to the external world is required
to have semantics, that is representation of the external world,
in addition to syntax, a set of rules that govern how thoughts
are related to one another.40 Both of these readings, if true, may
imply that neural models are not sentient and are not objects of
moral concern.
Though there seems to be widespread belief that the absence
of input negates the possibility of moral patient status, there
are at least some reasons for caution. First, the absence of a
nociceptive signal does not always entail the absence of pain.
For example, phantom limb pain occurs in patients who have
lost their limbs and the nociceptors that are normally respon-
sible for pain in the limbs. In other words, pain can occur in
the absence of a signal coming from the peripheral nervous
system. However, unlike in the neural array models, in the case
of phantom limbs, there was a previous connection to external
signals, raising the possibility that the cases are not relevantly
similar. Second, spontaneous patterns of activation can occur in
self-contained groups of neurons. In the absence of an ability
to decode neural patterns into content, we cannot decisively
rule out the possibility that this organized activity has some
representational content. Though some initial texts have started
to consider these challenges,41,42 this is an issue that requires
future exploration.
ANIMAL BRAIN-MACHINE INTERFACES (BMI)
The development of BMIs has already shown tremendous poten-
tial to help humans with serious medical conditions. Human
patients previously paralyzed or missing the ability to control a
limb have been able to move mechanical prostheses via technol-
ogy that reacts to the neural firing patterns that would normally
control natural body parts. This technology has been used to
help humans who have lost the ability to move a limb and has
the potential to be used by patients with more severe conditions
such as locked-in syndrome.
As described by workshop participant Andrew Schwartz, a
key step in the development of BMI technology was using single-
and multi-unit neural recordings in cortical areas associated
with motor control to monitor how certain neurons fired when
monkeys made arm movements.43 After these patterns were
detected and decoded, researchers inserted electrodes capable
of controlling prosthetic limbs into the monkeys’ brains. The
monkeys were then able to control the mechanical limbs with
their brains. This research made possible current BMI in humans,
and such interfaces are unlikely to have developed without these
animal models given our current inability to use non-invasive
technology to study the behavior of individual neurons.
BMI technology has also been put to use in controlling animal
behaviors in some well-publicized cases. The “roborat” was an
example of a rat whose movements were controlled by stimu-
lation of the reward centers of the brain.44 This technology is
being tested by the US military as a way to use animals with
cameras attached to them to gain information about otherwise
inaccessible locations. The developers of the roborat claim that
the fact that reward centers of the brain are the mechanism for
guiding the rat’s behavior suggests that this is not an unpleasant
experience.
However, some attendees at the meeting questioned this
claim, noting that motor control disorders in humans, which
cause involuntary movements, are known to be extremely aver-
sive. This could perhaps be empirically explored in more detail
by, for example, looking at cognitive bias tasks45 or assessing
facial features46 during control tasks.
Neuron-machine technology has also been put to educa-
tional, or at least commercial, use. A group called Backyard
Brains developed a “do-it-yourself kit” for creating what they call
a “roboroach.”47 Using this kit, children can dissect the antennae
off of insects, then insert electrodes that can be used to control
the movements of the animals. The company suggests that the
roboroach teaches children about the value of science.
In addition to BMI, another class of interesting findings could
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Dockendorf reported the use of cultured rat cortical neurons
to control the flight of a simulated aircraft,48 and Reger et al
inserted a portion of a lamprey’s nervous system into a small
robot as part of the control of its movements.49 In these cases,
neurons are used as necessary parts of machines.
Ethical Issues With Animal BMIs
Though there are some who question whether animal models
will be needed for neuroscience research going forward, the
development of BMI technologies beneficial for humans may
have been unlikely without certain extensive invasive experi-
ments on nonhuman animals. Thus, under a harm-benefit anal-
ysis of the use of animals in this type of medical research,
benefits to paralyzed and immobile humans, particularly as this
technology continues to evolve, can be included in the benefits
column. This application of BMI is in many ways a standard case
of using animal models to improve human medical conditions,
and so standard epistemic and ethical considerations relevant to
animal research apply.
For the military and educational applications of BMI, however,
new ethical issues arise. In cases where the animals’ movements
are being controlled by outside sources, questions arise as to how
aversive the experience is. In humans, we would also regard the
loss of liberty and autonomy resulting from external control as
a significant moral concern, even for young humans who may
have rudimentary agency at the level of monkeys or rats, raising
similar concerns for nonhuman animals. Although the monkeys
and rats used in BMI experiments are doubtlessly sentient, in
the case of the roboroach, the cockroach is, on many accounts
of sentience, less likely to have positive or negative experiences
that resemble those of humans. Consequently, the expected
harms of the research may be reduced in this regard. On the
other hand, it is not clear that this provides educational value
that could not be achieved through other means, so the benefits
of the kit are also questionable. Moreover, one might worry that
using animals this carelessly could lead to a general disregard for
the welfare of animals, and so might lead indirectly to additional
welfare concerns.50
Finally, in the cases of using neural arrays to guide or influ-
ence machinery, the main concern is related to above worries
about in vitro brains and the minimal conditions needed for
organized neural activity to count as morally significant. Again,
it seems intuitively unlikely in the above machine-brain inter-
face cases that the neural arrays in question have anything
approaching sentience, and even if the arrays did have some
aspects of conscious experience there would be no reason to
suppose that the phenomenology would have any positive or
negative affective valence. However, an additional wrinkle com-
pared with the in vitro neural cells is that neurons in machine-
brain interfaces do have a connection to “the outside world.”
That is, in contrast to claims that isolated neural arrays could
have “syntax, but not semantics,” the firing patterns of these
neural arrays are better candidates for representing features of
the outside world. Thus, there might exist additional reasons for
being cautious about their creation.
CHIMERAS
Chimeras are organisms that contain genetic material from 2
or more different sources. The chimeras of interest for neu-
roethics are organisms whose brains contain genetic material
from multiple sources. We use “neural chimeras” to refer to
such animals who have neurons from multiple genetic sources.
For such chimeras, nomenclature is often used referencing “X-Y
chimeras,” where X and Y refer to different types of organisms.
For example, a “human-animal chimera” refers to a chimera that
contains cells with a human origin and cells with a nonhuman
animal origin.
Modern technology allows gene insertion to take place early
in development while cells are still in the neural crest stage
of development. For bird species, this means that the inser-
tions can be performed in eggs so that no invasive surgery on
sentient organisms is required. By tracking how cells from the
neural crest develop into brain cells, researchers can selectively
intervene such that cells in particular regions of the developed
brain originate exclusively from the donor organism while cells
in other brain regions originate from the host embryo. Thus,
targeted precision for the combination of neural material is
possible.
At the workshop, Evan Balaban provided an example of the
power of neural chimeras for demonstrating the role of neurons
in behavior using his research.51 Male chickens and quail each
have their own characteristic vocalizations. In separate experi-
mental arms, Balaban and colleagues inserted quail cells into the
cellular progenitors of neurons that compose the midbrain, the
brainstem, and the forebrain of chicken embryos, respectively.
In the condition where quail neurons were in the midbrain, but
not the other 2 conditions, the resulting chicken-quail neural
chimeras made characteristic quail vocalizations along with the
characteristic quail head bob. This research demonstrated both
the utility of neural chimeras to produce behavioral changes
and a technique for using neural chimeras to investigate mecha-
nisms. Such techniques could be used to further investigate the
role of neurons in behavior.
In another study, mice with a human FOXP2 gene made
slightly different vocalizations and showed subtle anatomical
and physiological differences in brain regions used for speech
and other movement.52 This shows that a human gene can
influence brain development in a mouse and exert behavioral
effects. Although single genes rarely cause large effects by them-
selves, other methods of merging animal brains with larger-
scale functional elements, either biological or electronic, could
produce significant psychological changes, increasing an organ-
ism’s cognitive capacities.
The possibility of “humanizing” other animals has been the
subject of much controversy; the NIH has a ban on human and
nonhuman chimeras in place but has proposed lifting this ban.
However, there are currently no special restrictions on animal–
animal chimeras.
Ethical Issues With Chimeras
Inserting cells from one organism into another host organism
has the potential to alter the cognitive and affective capacities of
the host animal. It seems very likely that as technology becomes
more sophisticated, this technique could increase the intelli-
gence of organisms and could alter their capacity for positive and
negative feelings. Because the cognitive life of an organism and
the species of an organism are often tied to their moral status,
the moral status of a neural chimera—and correspondingly the
wrongness of subjecting that chimera to involuntary experimen-
tation, suffering, and death that would follow from this status—
cannot be assumed to be equivalent to the moral status of a
typical adult member of the host species.
If we combine neural cells from 2 different organisms to
create a neural chimera, this raises the question: what ethical
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apply the standards we would normally hold for the more pro-
tected of the 2 organisms? If so, in cases of nonprimate-primate
chimeras, current regulations would require that we account for
the psychological well-being of the chimera, because this is what
is currently required for the care of primates. And in cases of
human-animal chimeras, current regulations would place a very
high standard on such research that could even require consent,
making the permissibility of such research unlikely. The human-
mouse chimera discussed above, for example, would require full
institutional review board approval applying all of their ordinary
standards for human subjects research.
Of course, inserting a small number of human neurons into a
nonhuman animal is unlikely to transform the cognition of the
animal in any significant way, so a more sophisticated approach
would not apply blanket ethical rules to all chimeras based on
the species of origin but would instead attempt to assess the
moral significance of each alteration. This leads to difficult ques-
tions about how to assess the moral status of the created being.
It should be noted that although there has been much discussion
of human-animal chimeras in the bioethics literature already,
animal–animal chimeras raise related but underexplored ques-
tions about the moral status of the new organism.
The ethicist Robert Streiffer argued at the workshop that
the moral status of neural chimeras depends entirely on that
chimera’s cognitive capacities. If a neural chimera has the cog-
nitive capacities of an adult chimpanzee, then that animal has
the same moral status as an adult chimpanzee. If they have the
cognitive capacities of an adult beagle, then they have the same
moral status as an adult beagle. Such an account is revisionary
for animal research guidelines, for it implies that organisms who
have the same cognitive capacities should have the same pro-
tections. Thus, organisms who have the cognitive capacities of
young humans (perhaps including mice) should have the same
protections as young humans. Streiffer’s argument parallels an
approach that has significant agreement in the animal ethics
literature and claims the following: the species of an animal
is not morally significant, and animals who are the same in
virtually every way except for species membership have equal
moral status.
PERSONHOOD
Previous discussions of animal research neuroethics have
focused on how new technologies in the neurosciences open
up new and interesting ethical questions. However, a different
set of questions in neuroethics focuses on how new knowledge
from the neurosciences might inform existing ethical debates.
For example, the role of neuroscience in determining the
sentience of various species has been discussed extensively
in the literature. At our workshop, we chose to focus on how
neuroscience might inform a different set of morally salient
characteristics: those making up the concept of “personhood.”
As noted by the first speaker, Kristin Andrews, there are
various different senses of “personhood” that are sometimes
confused in debates on the topic. In the law, personhood signifies
legal standing and is contrasted exclusively with “mere things.”53
Thus, in the law, lawsuits can be filed on behalf of a person
whose rights have been violated. However, anything the law
classifies as a mere thing, including, at the present moment,
all nonhuman animals, has no such standing and, in fact, has
no more legal standing than inanimate objects. Some advocacy
groups, such as the Nonhuman Rights Project, are currently
working to see courts recognize that some nonhuman animals
can meet the legal standards for personhood.54
In contrast, psychological personhood refers to a suite of
psychological properties that provide the basis for suggesting
that a given entity has a cognitively sophisticated point of view.
These properties can include such capacities as metacognition,
a sense of self, moral behavior, and linguistic capacities, but
in general there is not widespread agreement as to what the
characteristics of psychological personhood should be.
Finally, the notion of most direct relevance for our workshop
is the notion of moral personhood, which refers to having a par-
ticular moral status that is worthy of a suite of protections that
generally go beyond the protections we provide for the “merely
sentient.” The moral notion of personhood is sometimes, but not
always, linked to the notion of moral agency; on this conception,
to be a person means to be a being capable of acting on moral
considerations, and this ability is suggested to make the being
worthy of an extra level of moral considerability.
As detailed by Andrews, the set of capacities that make up
the psychological notion of personhood, which often informs the
moral notion, can be divided into different categories. These cat-
egories include rationality, autonomy, subjectivity, personality, a
narrative sense of self, and relationships with others. It is pre-
sumably for these specific domains, rather than for personhood
considered as a whole, that neuroscience could be most relevant.
There are no conclusive findings yet, but future neuroscience
may inform debates about whether nonhuman animals have
person-like capacities. For example, it might turn out that spin-
dle cells enable certain advanced forms of cognition, in which
case they might be thought of as biomarkers for those functions.
Stanislas Dehaene has argued that certain features of human
neural organization have given rise to the capacity for more
abstract thought. And certainly those notions of personhood that
favor language capacity are likely to find particular properties of
neural organization that uniquely support this capacity.
In general, however, most attendees of the workshop agreed
that the notion of “personhood” itself was not especially help-
ful for most moral debates concerning the use of animals in
research. Focusing on personhood in the legal context makes
some sense given that the law is highly dependent on precedent
and that according to current precedent, “persons” and “things”
are logically exhaustive categories. However, in the moral con-
text, it is likely that specific traits associated with personhood,
rather than the combined cluster of traits that are vaguely
referred to as “personhood,” will be most relevant for ethical
questions. For example, whether there should be special pro-
visions for social housing or interaction seems to depend pri-
marily on an organism’s level of social attachment rather than
on broader questions of the organism’s “personhood.” Similarly,
whether an organism has a broader suite of possible interests
and desires made possible by a sense of self or by autonoetic
consciousness seems to be a question that does not turn on
particular definitions of personhood. Thus, workshop partici-
pants considered the individual capacities suggested making up
the notion of personhood as important and worthy of neurosci-
entific investigation, but the relevance of personhood itself was
questioned.
Ethical Issues Regarding Personhood
The neural basis of specific attributes that could make non-
human animals worthy of consideration beyond that of “mere
sentience” are currently unclear. This includes the capacity for
language, autonoetic consciousness, episodic memory, metacog-
nition, assent, consent, dissent, and complex social relation-
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specifically inform or guide our research guidelines, but many of
the capacities associated with personhood can provide valuable
insights into moral questions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The workshop raised a number of significant ethical issues
arising due to advances in animal neuroscience research. As the
authors of this report, our primary aim was to summarize the
deliberations of the workshop. However, an additional contri-
bution we make is to include policy recommendations for the
United States that aim at resolving some of the ethical issues
discussed at the workshop. These recommendations should not
be confused with recommendations arising out of the workshop
itself. Although workshop participants largely agreed about the
ethical issues arising, the recommendations themselves were
not discussed at the workshop and are the opinions of the
authors alone.
Recommendation 1: Develop Guidelines for Evaluating
Animal Models of Psychiatric Conditions
This panel raised serious concerns about the reliability of
current animal models of pain and psychiatric disorders. Given
that the tests that produce models of these conditions are
almost assuredly aversive, this raises the possibility that current
paradigms are causing a significant amount of unnecessary
harm to nonhuman animals. The critique of animal models from
Garner and other researchers is not without controversy but
raises serious issues that should be systematically addressed.
We recommend that a panel of experts be convened through
a well-respected organization, such as a Presidential Bioethics
Commission, the National Academy of Medicine, or the National
Academy of Sciences, that critically evaluates current methods
used for modeling human psychiatric conditions in animals. As
part of the report, a conference or workshop should be convened
that represents proponents of some of the strongest critiques of
these animal models as well as those who can argue ably on
behalf of current procedures. In contrast to some recent panels
convened by the NIH, it is critical that any such panel include
significant representation from professional ethicists who can
clearly articulate and fairly represent different positions in
contemporary ethical debate.
Recommendation 2: Allocate Greater Funding
to in Vitro Neurological Models
More government funding resources should be devoted to
developing 3D models of neural function with an aim of
replacing animal models of toxicity as the gold standard. This
has the potential to save thousands of animals from pain,
distress, and death in toxicity tests. Moreover, it might be
possible for sophisticated neural models to replace animal
testing in other domains as well. We applaud the EPA’s recent
decision to allocate $4.25 million to funding the research
of alternatives, including $849,000 to alternative models of
neurotoxicity, and recommend that government funding for
these initiatives continue to be greatly increased.
As part of this effort, funding should be provided to shift
away from treating animal models as the gold standard of neu-
rotoxicology testing. Hogberg’s presentation revealed a federal
regulatory shortcoming: the FDA evaluates alternative toxicity
tests by their degree of conformity to existing mouse models.
Because mouse models are imperfect models of human disease,
this limits the potential for developing disease models that are
as or more accurate models of human disease than mouse
models but that are less accurate models of mouse disease than
mouse models. The FDA and other existing regulatory bodies
should replace animal models as their gold standard with other
biomarkers. Because many of these models are still in devel-
opment, mouse models cannot be replaced overnight. If FDA
regulatory policy is ahead of the development of such models,
however, they can ensure that promising new models are evalu-
ated by their degree of conformity to human disease rather than
their degree of conformity to disease manifestations in mice and
incentivize researchers to produce models of disease relying on
human biomarkers. We support current efforts by the Intera-
gency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of Alternative
Methods and hope they are continued and accelerated.
Recommendation 3: Conduct Welfare Research
on the External Control of Animals
Research should be conducted to assess whether external con-
trol of animals’ behavior leads to aversive states. This could be
performed by, for example, looking at cognitive bias tasks or
assessing facial features, but in general a variety of assessments
should be used to ensure that any possible effect is noticed.
If it is found that external control does have an influence on
the welfare of animals, this needs to be taken into account in
assessments of the harms and benefits of similar research in
the future. Moreover, because we can be relatively confident
that at least some forms of external control of behavior could
be extremely aversive, guidelines should be established that
place limits on the forms of external control that are permitted.
For example, guidelines could permit only reward circuitry—
rather than punishment circuitry—for controlling behavior in
vertebrates.
As with all pain research, pain researchers should not con-
duct this research by performing independent, potentially aver-
sive interventions where it is feasible to instead (1) measure
indicators of discomfort on interventions that would already
have been conducted for other experimental purposes, or (2)
measure indicators of discomfort on nonhuman patients who
are already experiencing potentially aversive external behavioral
control. We think that often at least 1 of these 2 options is
feasible.
CONCLUSION
Participants at the “Neuroethics of Animal Research” workshop
from the Center for Neuroscience and Society and the Center
for the Interaction of Animals and Society at the University
of Pennsylvania raised significant ethical questions about new
research rendered possible by advances in neuroscience. Herein,
we have distilled these concerns and presented some discussion
points relevant to decisions about how to improve the ethical
standards of neuroscience research in nonhuman animals.
Technology is accelerating our ability to study and manipu-
late the brains of animals, and these new manipulations raise
new ethical questions. More so than in the case of humans,
cyborg and chimeric animals are not just thought experiments
for the future; they have already arrived. At the same time,
all signs indicate that societal concern for animal welfare is
increasing. This can be seen in the NIH’s decision to phase out
chimpanzee research and in numerous agricultural companies’
decisions to shift away from the most intensive confinement
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about the use of animals in invasive research are growing. It is
important to ensure that the advancement of neuroscience is
responsive to public concerns about the welfare of nonhuman
animals. This calls for the constant improvement of research
standards and the termination of research that is demonstrated
to be unethical as well as the continuous monitoring of new
ethical issues that arise from neuroscientific advances. The Penn
Neuroethics of Animal Research Workshop has yielded findings
that should be used toward these ethically urgent ends.
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